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1. INTRODUCTION
Conventional theory has it that delegating monetary policy to an independent
Central Bank will deliver lower rates of inflation than alternative regimes.  This
happens because Central Bank independence removes the temptation for
governments to follow time inconsistent policies, either in an attempt to achieve
output growth and employment above the natural rates, or for the sake of short term
political advantage.  The private sector, knowing that these temptations have been
removed, would then revise their inflationary expectations downwards and hence
their price and wage demands accordingly.
However, one of the most remarkable results in this literature is the claim that this
lower inflation can be achieved at no cost in terms of output fluctuations.  Not all
models of Central Bank independence have this property.  For example Rogoff’s
(1985) model does not.  But the model of Alesina and Gatti (1995) does,1 and it has
been offered as an explanation of the empirical evidence which shows that low
inflation can be obtained at no cost. For example Cukierman (1996) finds negative
correlations between inflation rates and the degree of independence of OECD
Central Banks; while Alesina and Summers (1993) and Eijfinger et al (1998) show
that there is no discernible relation between the variability of output and that degree
of independence.  The explanation offered by Alesina and Gatti is that Central Bank
independence eliminates the effect of electoral uncertainty on the cycle.2  Moreover,
any lags in counter-cyclical policies could easily have the effect of exaggerating
rather than dampening that cycle.  Removing those two elements by delegating
monetary policy to an authority not subject to electoral or cyclical concerns would
clearly reduce the variability of output while reducing inflation.  However, what this
analysis does not cover is the possibility that increased attention to inflation control
may, in itself, increase the natural variability of the economic part of the cycle and
hence overall output variability.  A priori one cannot tell which way the trade-off will
go and the Alesina-Gatti model does not say.
                                                
1 See also the model in Alesina (1989)2
What is missing from this analysis is a clear statement of whether, and under what
conditions, an independent Central Bank will actually deliver lower inflation at no
cost – generally, not at all, or only in special cases – and whether the suppression of
the political cycle in economic policies is strong enough to deliver this result. Policy
makers need to know that before they come to rely on the Bank’s independence.
Campillo and Miron (1997), Posen (1998) and Forder (1998), for example, all point
out that low inflation in the OECD area cannot be accounted for by institutional
arrangements alone; other factors, such as fiscal policy, are also needed.  Indeed,
Melitz (1997) finds that monetary and fiscal policies tend to be used together to
achieve inflation and output targets.  So the explanation of the empirical evidence
may simply be that a second instrument has been used.  Certainly, theoretical
analysis shows that the traditional results can be turned on their head once a second
instrument – say fiscal policy, or structural reform and labour market policies - is
brought into play3; and also when governments are subject to electoral pressures
(Demertzis et al, 1999).  Likewise Cukierman and Lippi (1999) and Guzzo and
Velasco (1999) point out that Central Bank independence does not maximise Social
Welfare; and that that result may influence wage bargaining - and hence the inflation
and output outcomes.
It is not clear from the available evidence therefore, whether independent Central
Banks do actually deliver lower inflation and at no extra cost.  However, given that
other policies and other policy makers could influence the outcomes, it is necessary
to examine this question using the delegation model on its own terms. That will
allow the Central Bank to pursue a proper “commitment solution” - uninterrupted
by the actions of others with different priorities, but taking into account the fact that
political changes would affect the private sector behaviour which must condition the
Bank’s actions. We therefore study the inflation and output outcomes that would
follow from such commitment solutions.
                                                                                                                                                       
2 Posen (1998) however, finds little systematic evidence of this in practice, even
among the non-German countries with dependent Central Banks (see also Mangano
1998).
3 A point first made by Blackburn and Christiensen (1989).3
2. THE MODEL
In line with the standard literature, our world is described by a Lucas supply
function (Rogoff 1985, Alesina and Gatti 1995). The level of output is positively
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The timing is such that shocks occur after the private sector has negotiated the wages
to which authorities need to react. A given government optimises the following loss
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where the last term, (yt – k), shows the source of an expansionary bias built in the
objective function. The government intends to achieve a level of output k>0 that is
higher than the natural rate.  It does so in order to overcome the distortionary effects
o f  t a x a t i o n  a n d  p u b l i c  e x p e n d i t u r e  m a d e  f o r  s o c i a l  r e a s o n s .   T h i s  i s  t h e  c l a s s i c
formulation given by Persson and Tabellini (1990).
Parameter  β  is the weight given to the output objective, and demonstrates the
government’s relative priorities with respect to the two objectives. Substituting (1) in
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Consequently, if inflation is delegated to a body primarily concerned with reducing
inflation, and described by preferences b<β , the results are unambiguous: inflation is4
reduced but at the expense of greater output variability4. This is the result presented
by Rogoff (1985).
2.1 Political Uncertainty
Alesina and Gatti (1995) however, reverse this result by using a model in which
different political parties come into play. The timing now requires that wage
negotiations are undertaken before elections. This automatically introduces electoral
uncertainty which biases the private sector’s inflationary expectations and, given the
model, destabilises output.  More specifically, there are now two sources of output
instability; the first is exogenous supply shocks as before, but the second arises from
the uncertainty of which party will rule after the elections. Hence by removing
monetary policy from political control, the argument goes, that part of the variance
in output which is due to electoral uncertainty is removed and output variability
falls as a result (provided the impact of supply shocks does not get larger).  The
other source of output instability however, is still there. The probability of getting an
inflation averse, as opposed to an instability averse, government will therefore be the
crucial variable for determining the outcomes.
The model is as follows: there are two parties D and R (Democrats and Republicans)












22 π ( )    where 0<bR<bD.
These parameter values imply that party D cares more about output stabilisation,
whereas party R cares more about inflation.  Party D is expected to win the elections
with probability P and party R with probability 1-P.  Wages are negotiated first, then
one of the two parties gets elected, and finally a shock ε  occurs to which the
governing party has to react.  The timing is crucial because risk-averse wage
                                                

























negotiators are negatively affected by the uncertainty of the electoral outcome and
would therefore try to cover themselves in advance.
Anticipated inflation and output variability are now different to the case where a
















































































for output. From (8) and (9) we get an expression for output variability
var( )
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2 σ ε (10)
To discover if delegating monetary policy to an independent and conservative body
produces lower inflation and lower output variability we have to compare what is
achieved with an independent Central Bank, i.e.
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with what can be achieved without an independent Central Bank, i.e:
E(
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If Central Bank independence is to come at no extra cost, then we must have Eπ NI >
Eπ I and V(yNI) ≥  V(yI) respectively.
3. WHEN IS PRICE STABILITY ACHIEVED AT NO EXTRA COST?
We now compare (11) to (13), and (12) to (14), across the whole spectrum of
probabilities to show how changing perceptions about the electoral outcome can
have an impact on the effectiveness of the Central Bank’s policies - even when the
latter are set independently. We start by looking first at the outcomes when there is
no uncertainty, and then when the electoral outcome is unknown.
3.1 Electoral Certainty
1.  Assume the following ordering of preferences:  ! b< b R  <bD.  There are three
possible cases in which electoral outcomes are known in advance:
A. P=0
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C.  b ˆ < bR=bD=b






( !) + b







                                                                                                                                                       
5 b ˆ is the degree of the Central Bank’s conservativeness.7
An ultra-conservative6 central bank will therefore, always achieve lower inflation -
but never lower output variability.
2. Suppose now that the Central Bank’s preferences are between those of the
two parties, i.e.: b b b
RD << ! .  The same three cases now imply:
A.  P=0





















































C.  b b b b
RD == < !

























In this case, an independent Central Bank still achieves one of its targets but never
both. The target which it does achieve, depends on which party wins the elections. If
the more conservative Republicans are elected, an independent Central Bank will
produce lower output variability, but higher inflation rates than a government
managed Central Bank.  That is because the independent Central Bank’s preferences
are more liberal (inflation permissive) than the elected government would have
chosen for itself.
By contrast, if it is the Democrats that are elected, an independent Central Bank
would produce lower inflation but higher output variability - this time because the
Bank’s priorities are more conservative (inflation-averse) than the elected
government would have chosen for itself7.
                                                
6 i.e.  more inflation-averse than anyone in this economy would vote for.
7  Obviously the same logic will also apply to the case where both parties have the
same inflation preferences (but less than  ! b), as case C above demonstrates.  But this8
The upshot here is that, given electoral certainty, an independent Central Bank can
never produce lower inflation at no cost.  Either such a bank will achieve lower
inflation but higher output variability - if the Central Bank is more conservative than
the government - or it will produce higher inflation but lower output variability if
the Central Bank is more liberal than the government.
3.2 Electoral Uncertainty
The traditional analysis of an independent Central Bank relies on the fact that wage
negotiations take place before the electoral outcome is known - or equivalently
before the exact monetary stance, and hence inflationary pressures, are known.  We
therefore introduce that uncertainty directly, using (11), (12) and (13), (14) when
0<P<1 and bR < bD, in the conventional manner.
In fact (11) and (13) imply an independent Central Bank will always generate lower
average inflation rates, if E( E( IN I ππ )) < :
i.e. if ! () ( )
() ( )
bk
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Now that is unambiguously true if  ! bb
R ≤≤  b D since 0<P<1.  But it is not so
obviously true if b b
R D b << ! .  Indeed an independent Central Bank will generate
higher average inflation if (16) is negative:
i.e. if  (! )( ) ( !)( ), bb b P b b b
RD D R −+ > +− 11
                                                                                                                                                       
is a less interesting case because it is unlikely that any economy would voluntarily














This result means that a dependent Central Bank will generate lower inflation if the
probability of a Democrat government being elected is relatively low (lower than a
critical value PC); or an independent Central Bank will do so when that probability is
relatively high (greater than PC), assuming that bR < ! b<bD in both cases.  That is as
expected. Hence, the Alesina and Gatti assertion that there always exists a range of
values for  ! b between bR and bD, for which an Independent Central Bank produces
lower inflation, is correct. The crucial point however, is that inflation performance is
linked not only to the preference parameters but also to probability P as well. It is
entirely possible therefore, for P to fall below the critical value PC at certain times
and hence remove the benefits of an independent central bank. The only thing policy
authorities can do to prevent that is to insist on a very conservative policy stance: i.e.
that  ! bb
R ≤ .  But that may increase the variability of output at the same time.
To summarise, an independent Central Bank will only generate lower inflation rates,
in general, if R(P) = E(π NI) - E(π I) is positive. That requires P to be greater than PC.
The problem here is that those who have to design institutional structures cannot
know that the value of P will never fall below PC – even if they can be sure that their
Central Bank will stick faithfully to a pre-committed anti-inflation path – unless they
always choose a Central Bank that is more conservative than every possible
government ( ! bb
R ≤ ). But if they do that, the regime will not allow social welfare to
be maximised (Guzzo and Velasco, 1999) with the result that the voting public will
inevitably choose governments designed to get closer to that social welfare
maximum (Demertzis et al, 1999a)8. That could take the form of bD increasing or of bR
increasing towards bD, both of which increase PC. But it could equally well happen
when PC=0, because governments are more often than not, judged on more than just
their inflation records such as public expenditure policies, social and job protection
schemes, civil justice, foreign or defence policies etc. This automatically reduces the
relevance of inflation performance as a criterion for elections.
                                                
8 See Figure 1 and Section 3 of that paper.10
4. OUTPUT FLUCTUATIONS WITH ELECTORAL UNCERTAINTY
We now turn to the problem of whether an independent Central Bank would
generate higher output variability than a non-independent Central Bank. To answer
that question, we define a function Q(P) =V y V y NI I ()( ) −  which shows that output
variability is higher with a dependent Central Bank whenever Q(P) is positive.
Conversely, output fluctuations will be higher with an independent Central Bank
when Q(P)≤ 0. This therefore, matches the inflation comparison function (R(P) as
defined in section 3.2), and we can again look for critical values of P at which the
independent Central bank will start to deliver higher output fluctuations. In
particular, the independent Central Bank will only be “doing better” than its
dependent counterparts on both criteria, if Q(P) and R(P) are both simultaneously
positive. Figure 1 illustrates the point. The next step is to determine the conditions
under which that can happen.
4.1  Determining when Output Fluctuations are lower with Central Bank
Independence
From (12) and (14), we can see that an independent Central Bank will deliver higher
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where g2=k2/σ 2 is the political “signal to noise” ratio, measuring the strength of
policy commitments relative to the size of the typical output disturbance.
To facilitate the algebra, let x b y b and z b
DR =+ =+ = + 11 1 ,( !).  That implies bD-bR
= x-y, and that y<z<x if  ! , bbb u t zy


















We can now express Q(P) = V y V y NI I ()( ) −  in the following polynomial form:




























































The sign of A4 depends on the temporary assumption that y≤ z<x; for if
zy i e bb
R << (..! ) it would be negative.  We shall return to the latter possibility (z≤ y)
in cases II and III below.  For now we take y<z.
Notice also that the signs of A2 and A3 depend on the size of g, the political “signal
to noise” ratio.  If g is large, A2 is negative and A3 positive.  That is the case where
the policy makers have ambitious targets for output and employment.  But if g is
small, they can only have very modest ambitions beyond simply stabilising output
shocks.  In that case, A2>0 and A3<0.
Now we are in a position to determine if there are values of  ! b, g and P for which the
inequality Q(P)≥ 0 in (20) is satisfied.  If so, an independent Central Bank will
generate lower output variability at those values. We proceed as follows:
•   We first attempt to establish that Q(P)=0 has at most one root in the interval
0≤ P≤ 1, given arbitrary choices for  ! b<b D and g. For if there is only one root, P0
say, and Q(0) is positive, then there is always the possibility of a free lunch for an12
independent Central Bank– i.e. lower inflation and lower output fluctuations - if
P0>PC. But that result is only available so long as P falls in the interval (PC ,P0).
Below PC or above P0 the dependent Central Bank will be doing better, with









•   Conversely, if Q(P)=0 has no roots in the interval 0≤ P≤ 1, while Q(0)>0, then the








•   If on the other hand, Q(0) is negative9 and Q(P)=0 has only one root in the
                                                
9 Clearly, if Q(0)=0, then a positive or negative first derivative Q’(P) will be the
determining conditions – rather than the sign of Q(0).13
interval 0≤ P≤ 1, then a free lunch is only available if P falls in the interval (PC,1) or

















•   Finally, if there are no roots (while Q(0) remains negative), then there is no free








To determine the number of roots to Q(P)=0 in any interval, we use the following
theorem:
Theorem 1 (Budan-Fourier): If a and b (a<b) are not roots of the polynominal p(x), of
degree n, then the number of real roots lying between a and b is equal to the number
sign changes lost when the sequence of derivatives
p(x), p’(x), p’’(x), ..... p(n)(x) (21)
is evaluated first at x=a and then at x=b, or less than that by an even number
(Demidovich and Maron, 1973, pp 176/7).
Corollary: If the number of sign changes lost is exactly one, then there is exactly one
real root in the interval (a,b).
However, given the ambiguity in the signs of A2 and A3, the sequences of derivatives
will evidently have to be evaluated for small and large values of g separately.
Similarly it is also convenient to evaluate them separately for bb
R < ! ,  ! bb
R = and
! bb R > , given the ambiguity in the sign of A4.
Case I: b b b RD << ! .  This case implies a moderately conservative central bank.  The
derivative sequence of Q(P) as implied by (21), is:
Q’(P) = 3A1 P2 + 2A2 P + A3
Q’’(P) = 6A1 P + 2A2     and,
Q’’’(P) = 6A1
Evaluating these derivatives at P=0 and at P=1, when g is very small and then
sufficiently large, yields the sign pattern reported in table 1:
Table 1: The sign pattern for theorem 1, when  ! bb
R >>>>15
Small g Large g
at P=0 at P=1 at P=0 at P=1
Q(p) +veb) -ved) +veb) -ved)
Q’(p) -ve +ve +ve -ve
Q’’(p) +ve +vea) -ve -ve




Notes:  a) subject to an upper bound to the value of bD or a lower bound on  ! b.
However, these bounds don’t matter since a change of sign in this
position would not alter the number of sign changes, or sign changes lost.
b) independent of the value of g.
c) independent of the values of either g or  ! b.
d) independent of the value of g, but subject to an upper bound on the
value of  ! b which is strictly larger than bR.  That upper bound is a
complicated function of bD and bR.  It is the value of  ! bwhich solves y4 (z2-
x2) + x4 (1-z2)(y2-z2) = 0.  That value clearly lies somewhere between bR
and bD since z=y leaves this expression negative (as in the table) and z=x
leaves it positive, given that z≥ 1 and y<z≤ x.  The text and the table
therefore refer to the “moderately conservative” case with  ! bb elow  that
bound.  If we took a more liberal case , with  ! bbetween that bound and bD,
the final two figures in the last row of table 1 would be 1 and 1 - implying
two (or possibly zero) roots in the interval [0, 1] if g is small, and none in
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Q:       = bR b ˆ
  Q:      >bR b ˆ
A B
Figure 1: The Free Lunch Intervals when  ! b≥  bR and g is small; A: when  ! b> b R,
B: when  ! b=bR. The independent Central Bank delivers better results when





R:        = bR b ˆ
b ˆ R:     >  bR
Q:         > bR
liberal
b ˆ







Q:        =   bR b ˆ
Figure 2:  as for figure 1, but larger values of g. A: the Free Lunch Interval with a
Moderately Conservative Central Bank; B: its extension when the Bank is
Liberal; and C: its alternative when the Central Bank is more conservative.17
Commentary:  Table 1 therefore shows that in the moderately conservative case
there is exactly one root to Q(P)=0 and that Q(0)>0 holds, irrespective of whether g is
small or large10.  That follows from theorem 1.  Thus V(yI)<V(yNI) holds for small
values of P, and V(y I)>V(yNI) for larger values11; and there is just one cross-over
point P0.  Hence a “free lunch” becomes possible if P0>PC. But beyond the interval
(PC, P0), if it exists, an independent Central Bank will generate longer output
fluctuations whenever it would generate lower inflation rates.  Conversely, it would
generate smaller output fluctuations where it would yield higher inflation rates.
Case II:  ! b=b R.  The Bank adopts a strongly conservative stance.  The analysis has to
be adapted since now A4=0 and Q(0)=0.  That means P=0 is a root.  For the
remaining interval
!() QP A P A P A P =+ + ≠ 1
2
23 0
with derivatives  ! () !''( )
' QP APA a n d Q P A =+ = 22 12 1 .
For that interval we get table 2 to replace table 1:
Table 2: The sign pattern for theorem 1, when  ! bb
R ====
Small g Large g
at p≅ 0 at p=1 at p≅ 0 at p=1
! Q(p) -ve +ve +ve +ve
!' Q ( p ) +ve +ve +ve -ve




Consequently there is exactly one root beyond P=0 if g is small, but none if g is large.
However the values of Q(P) itself have to be recovered from (20).  We have Q(0)=0
whatever the value of g, and Q(1)>0 likewise.  That means an independent Central
Bank gives lower inflation and lower output fluctuations for larger P values if g is
                                                
10 Evidently P=0 is not a root of Q(P)=0 in this case, nor in general is P=1.  Theorem 1
can therefore be applied directly.  For the one particular value of  ! bthat implies
Q(1)=0, see note d) in table 1, we can take a value of P arbitrarily close to (but smaller
than) 1 and get exactly the same result.
11 See also Demertzis (1999).18
small.  And it will do so for all P values if g is large. (See figures 1 and 2).
Case III:  ! bb
R < .  The Bank adopts an ultra-conservative position.  What happens in
this case obviously depends on how far  ! bis set below the reference value bR.  If it is
only a small amount, then by continuity the sign pattern won’t change from table 1
except in row 1 where  ! b=b R produced zero entries when P=0, and reversed signs








4 0 ! !
all z, and if d ! b is sufficiently small, we get table 3
from table 1; and from Q(0)=0 and Q(1)>0 in the  ! b=b R case.
Table 3: The sign pattern for theorem 1, when  ! bb R <
Small g Large g
at p=0 at p=1 at p=0 at p=1
Q(p) -ve +ve -ve +ve
Q’(p) -ve +ve +ve +ve
Q’’(p) +ve +ve -ve -ve




This implies a single root in Q(P)=0; and again Q(0)<0 whatever the value of g.  It
also implies lower inflation and smaller output fluctuations with an independent
Central Bank - but only for larger values of P.
4.2 Summary: When Does a Free Lunch Interval Exist?
(a)  A guaranteed free lunch in all circumstances?  From (17), we must have  ! bb
R =
and a large value for g, for this to be true; and also Q(0)!0 and Q(1)>0.  Note
that a small value of g is no good since then one root exists for Q(P)=0 and
small values of P won’t allow a free lunch: see table 2 below.  Notice also that a
small value of  ! bb R >  might nearly do it since PC would be small.  But then
Q(1)<0, so that output fluctuations would still be larger for large values of P
and an independent Central Bank.
(b)  No free lunch ever.  This happens if PC!P0: see below, equation (22), for19
conditions where that can happen.  It could also happen where Q(0)"0 and
Q(1)<0, but we have found no cases of that.
(c)  A limited free lunch zone is available for limited periods of time only if P∈ (PC,P0)
and P0>PC.  The key questions then, are how large is that zone; and whether it
can be expanded by the policy makers?
For case (b), recall that (15) and (17) imply that R(P)=E(π NI) - E(#I) is an upward
sloping function of P such that R(P)=0 at P=PC; but R(P)<0 for P<PC. Moreover PC=0
and R(0)=0 if  ! bb
R = . To determine now exactly when a limited free lunch can exist,
recall Q(P)=V(yNI)-V(yI) will have one root between P=0 and P=1 at most, and that
Q(0)>0, if  ! bb R > .  Similarly (20) implies Q(0)=0 if  ! bb
R = . But if Q(PC)>0 in either
case, then we have at least a limited free lunch interval. Using (20), we get
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Hence Q(PC)=0 if z=y.  There is no free lunch interval if  ! bb
R = therefore.  More
generally, Q(PC)>0 is guaranteed so long as g is large enough and  ! bb
R > , since the
middle term of (22) is positive.  But, if g is small (g$0) and  ! bb
R > , (22) can easily
imply Q(PC)<0.  For example bR=0 and bD= ! b!0.8 will do it.  That is not a very liberal
regime.  Similarly bR=0,  ! b=½(bD+1)-1 and bD≥ 4 will do it.  That is a little more
liberal.
4.3 Can we extend the Free Lunch Zone?
There is no guarantee that a free lunch interval exists in the moderately conservative
or liberal cases, or even in the very conservative case if g is rather small.  However, if
such an interval does exist, the policy makers could extend it either by decreasing
! bif ∂∂ < QP b
C () / ! , 0  since (16) implies ∂∂ < RP b () /! 0; or alternatively by increasing20
g, since R(P) is invariant to g.  The latter option is always open.  The former option
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It is straight forward to check that ∂∂ QP b
C () / !  is positive if g is large; but that it is
negative if g is small and x<z2/(z-1), assuming that (22) has yielded Q(PC)>0 in the
first place.
These two results therefore, imply that trying to increase the free lunch interval by
decreasing  ! b when g is large, will trigger a conflict between lower inflation and
smaller output fluctuations. However, when g is small and x<z2/(z-1) - which means
that bD must be no more than 2+! b if the Central Bank is relatively liberal, but is
effectively unlimited if it is very conservative - decreasing  ! b will indeed increase
that interval.  However it remains a limited interval, and could only exist if (22) is
positive.
5. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
Our analysis shows that the only sure way to get low inflation at no cost, is to
appoint a very conservative Central Bank, with  ! b=b R, in the countries where g takes
a large value. It is of course possible to get something of the same result under other
conditions, but then not for all circumstances and only for limited periods of time.
It is interesting to note that Alesina and Gatti’s own example falls into the latter
category.  They consider a world with bR=0, bD=3 and  ! b=0.5; P=0.5 and k2=σ 2=1.
That yields PC=0.444, A1=-6.75, A2=18.504, A3=-19.333, A4=8.889 and P0>1.21
Consequently the low inflation at no cost result will hold no more than half the time




Figure 3: The Alesina-Gatti Example
In fact this is a case with a relatively small g value, since A2>0; and also a relatively
liberal Central Bank since  ! bexceeds the upper bound of note d) in table 1.  Hence a
relatively liberal Central Bank could, in this case, produce lower inflation when the
Democrats have a better chance of winning elections than the Republicans.  But it
would not do so when the Republicans are more likely to win.
More generally it would be interesting to check if the countries which have more
conservative Central Banks and stronger policy commitments actually do lie below
the average in inflation and output variability in practice for their degree of
independence. And conversely, that the others lie above the regression line. We have
sketched those outcomes in Figure 4.  Unfortunately measuring  ! band g with any
degree of objectivity is not going to be possible in practice, and we have not












Figure 4: Identifying the conservative Central Banks with strong commitments to
Stabilisation.
6. CONCLUSIONS
No Central Bank, however independent, can promise to deliver lower inflation at no
cost all of the time.  It is only possible to do so if the bank is very conservative,
(! ) bb R =  and the “political signal to noise” ratio, g, is sufficiently large.  That may
seem an improbable combination.  More likely are the conditions under which there
is no free lunch at all (Pc≥ Po).  Between these two polar cases, lower inflation for no
cost is possible; but only in certain circumstances or  for limited periods of time.
Second, the possibility of low inflation at no cost appears to have very little to do
with the elimination of the political cycle. The elimination of the that cycle is neither
sufficient to guarantee low inflation at no cost; nor is it necessary to prevent the
opposite (i.e. higher inflation and/or output fluctuations). Instead the low inflation
at no cost result depends on having both the right degree of conservatism and
sufficiently ambitious (or distorted) output targets, when the Central Bank is
independent. But the same outcome can also be obtained with a dependent Central
Bank and suitable values for those same parameters. Thus an independent Central
Bank may be able to reduce the political part of the cycle – in the worst case the cycle
will be constrained to what bR will allow. But it cannot reduce or eliminate an
economy’s overall cycle at no cost, except in special cases. This is the important23
lesson in our results since we are concerned with the existence and amplitude of the
economy’s cycle, rather than its source.
The intuition behind a possible free lunch therefore, has to depend on a weakening
rather than the elimination of the economy’s natural cycle. Any restriction like   ! b≤ bR
will lower the inflation bias by more under independence because the more liberal
elements in society, represented by bD, are no longer expected to play any effective
role in determining inflation. There could however, still be a cycle; but that cycle will
be smaller than before since, under an independent Central Bank, it will be restricted
by the lower value of bR. In other words, we get closer to a single target, single
instrument world– even if the temptation to switch policies is not entirely
eliminated.
In the same way, a large value of k relative to σ ε  would normally lead to larger
policy switches as the quadratic term in output failures would dominate when bD
was in office - the equilibrium value of y being zero, not k.  A conservative
independent Central Bank would then find it more acceptable to stay a roughly
constant distance away from an unattainable k - than it would have done if k were
smaller or  ! b larger in relation to σ ε  , or if bD were let back into the game.24
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